

What Can Philosophy Do for Legal Interpretation?

Editor's Preface

Thermometers read 34°C in the outside world when, in a comfortable, softly-lighted, inner room of the Granada's *Palacio de Congresos*, the workshop "What Can Philosophy Do for Legal Interpretation?" – the one I was charged with organizing within the XXII IVR World Congress – commenced.

Only a couple of the scheduled speakers were present, out of the originally-planned five – the missing ones not being there for duly certified reasons. But I had their carefully written papers (and indeed, one of them, whose identity I am not authorized to disclose here, even prepared two separate papers for the event).

A few friends kindly volunteered as proxy speakers.

The workshop sailed off, through the rough seas of open dissent as well as the calmer waters of enquiring discussion, in a mix of shifting languages, always enjoying of devoted interpreters and an enduring, deeply-interested, public.

The papers published below represent the final versions of those originally played in Granada (plus a follow-up of my own).

Unfortunately, readers will miss the clumsy machinery – and rustic taste – of the show. They will get cool texts for quiet armchair-speculations, though; and the tradeoff does not seem wholly unfair.

Pierluigi Chiassoni